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Introduction
As foundations increasingly embrace the prin-
ciples of strategic philanthropy — explicit 
goals, evidence-based strategies, evaluation of 
progress — warnings about the approach have 
gained currency. Strategic grantmakers, some 
contend, assert the right to set social change 
agendas while undervaluing the judgments of 
practitioners who are working for change on 
a daily basis. They risk treating their grantees 
as mere contractors rather than full partners 
(Patrizi & Heid Thompson, 2010). And they are 
likely to oversimplify highly complex problems, 
thus locking their grantees into rigid theories 
of change and indicator frameworks that are 
insufficiently responsive to dynamic situations 
(Patrizi, Heid Thompson, Coffman, & Beer, 
2013; Harvey, 2016; Kania, Kramer, & Russell, 
2014). Nevertheless, in a field where feedback is 
uneven and vast sums of money can easily be 
squandered, the reasons for conducting goal-
driven, evidence-based grantmaking remain 
compelling (Brest & Harvey, 2018).
The challenge for strategic grantmakers is 
to reconcile a dilemma at the heart of their 
enterprise. They have an obligation — not just 
to their founders, but to the public that has 
entrusted them with generous tax benefits — 
to put their funds to the best possible use and 
take full advantage of the unusual freedom 
they have to choose where their money goes. 
This means pursuing ambitious aims through 
Key Points
 • Strategic philanthropy requires striking a 
balance between two extremes. On one 
side is unilateral agenda-setting by the 
foundation and excessive reliance on its 
own intellectual frameworks and methods. 
On the other side is too much deference to 
competing voices from the field, with the risk 
that funding will be haphazard and incoher-
ent. This article describes how the Delaware 
River Watershed Initiative, supported by the 
William Penn Foundation, has struggled to 
position itself between these two extremes. 
 • Based on an evaluation conducted during 
the first four years of the initiative, the 
article examines four interrelated tensions: 
upfront planning versus emergent strategy, 
top-down versus bottom-up management, 
strategic focus versus opportunistic 
flexibility, and ambitious aspirations versus 
realistic expectations. 
 • After discussing how each of these tensions 
has played out as the initiative has evolved, 
the article concludes by suggesting that the 
role of evaluation in strategic philanthropy is 
not just to provide feedback on the progress 
of a strategy, but also to facilitate a learning 
process to help participants clarify their 
strategy by reconciling such tensions.
carefully formulated courses of action. Yet 
their success depends on grantee organizations 
that are accountable to their own boards and 
doi: 10.9707/1944-5660.1495
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endeavored to achieve this balance in its support 
for watershed protection and restoration. The 
Delaware River Watershed Initiative (DRWI) is a 
continuing effort, launched by the foundation in 
2014, that has sought to align the efforts of more 
than 50 conservation organizations, land trusts, 
and research groups toward improving the con-
dition of watersheds in a major East Coast river 
basin. Although the foundation had been making 
grants in support of watershed restoration and 
land preservation since the mid-1990s (Sherman 
& Wilson, 2003), the DRWI represented a dra-
matic shift away from responsive grantmaking, 
guided by broad programmatic criteria, toward 
a much more strategic approach. Emphasizing 
the importance of sound science, the foundation 
used data and models to inform the location and 
design of on-the-ground land protection and 
restoration projects, and invested in an exten-
sive water-quality monitoring program in the 
hope of demonstrating the initiative’s effective-
ness (Freedman, Arscott, Haag, & Hall, 2018). 
A formative evaluation was commissioned to 
assess the initiative’s first three-year phase. (See 
Table 1.) That evaluation, which is the basis of 
this article, contributed to a strategic learning 
stakeholders and have their own goals that may 
not be consistent with those of their funders. 
Although the inherent power imbalance in 
philanthropy can easily lead foundations to treat 
grantees as subordinates, foundations must work 
cooperatively and respectfully with grantees for 
practical as well as ethical reasons. If they fail to 
do so, they may tie the hands of the implement-
ers of their strategies and ignore the knowledge 
of those who are laboring in the trenches 
(Dowie, 1995, 2001; Delfin & Tang, 2006; Harvey, 
2016; Reich, 2018).
Strategic grantmakers find themselves teetering 
on a narrow edge between hubris and humil-
ity. On one side is unilateral agenda-setting 
and excessive reliance on their own intellec-
tual frameworks and methods. On the other 
side is too much deference to competing voices 
from the field, with the risk that funding will 
be haphazard and incoherent. The art of stra-
tegic philanthropy is to strike the right balance 
between these two extremes.
This article examines how the William Penn 
Foundation, of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, has 
FIGURE 1  The Evaluation Team
 •  Edward W. Wilson, an evaluation professional with three decades of experience, specializing in the 
review of conservation programs.
 •  David LaRoche, an independent consultant with more than 40 years of experience in watershed project 
development, management, and evaluation.
 •  Paul L. Freedman and Kathy Hall of LimnoTech, a leading environmental engineering and science firm 
specializing in water-related issues.
 •  Matt James and Dave Hubbard of Coastal Restoration Consultants Inc., experts in on-the-ground 
stream and wetland restoration projects.
 •  Carol Bromer, a research specialist with nearly 20 years of experience assessing environmental 
programs.
Evaluation activities included:
 • In-depth interviews
 • Participant observation
 • Field and site visits
 • Expert reviews of the use of water-quality monitoring and modeling tools
 • An online survey of grantees
 • Three written reports 
 • Four presentations to grantees
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process the foundation and its partners have 
gone through as they have worked to reconcile 
four interrelated tensions:
• upfront planning versus emergent strategy,
• top-down versus bottom-up management,
• strategic focus versus opportunistic flexibil-
ity, and
• ambitious aspirations versus realistic 
expectations.
We will describe how each of these tensions has 
played out during the first several years of the 
DRWI, and we will conclude by challenging 
conventional wisdom among foundations about 
the role of evaluation in strategic philanthropy. 
Foundations typically have seen evaluation as 
a feedback mechanism that tracks progress in 
implementing a strategy and alerts them when 
corrective action should be taken. In the DRWI, 
as in many other foundation initiatives, the chal-
lenge was not so much to assess the progress of 
the strategy as to clarify what the strategy was. 
The evaluators’ chief contribution was to facil-
itate a collaborative learning process by calling 
attention to the various tensions inherent in the 
initiative and encouraging the William Penn 
Foundation and its partners to find ways to 
address them.
Upfront Planning Versus 
Emergent Strategy
Since “strategy” is commonly defined as “a 
plan of action” (American Heritage Dictionary 
Online, 2019), the existence of a plan or an 
explicit theory of change would seem to be an 
essential feature of strategic philanthropy. But 
strategy-driven grantmaking can go badly awry, 
as even some leading exponents of strategic 
philanthropy have warned. One question is who 
does the planning. Harvey (2016) has noted that 
strategic philanthropy “can create delusions of 
omniscience in many program officers” (p. 1), 
who may well have less experience and hands-on 
knowledge of the field than their grantees. 
Another question is when and how the planning 
is conducted. As Patrizi and colleagues (2013) 
have suggested,
Much of the knowledge needed to support strategy 
can arise only during implementation. … Although 
some dynamics of change in a system might be 
“knowable” before strategy launch, much of what 
needs to be learned about these dynamics depends 
upon actual experience. (p. 55)
The point is not to abandon strategic planning, 
but to avoid treating it as solely an upfront exer-
cise conducted unilaterally by the foundation 
and ending when implementation begins (Patrizi 
& Heid Thompson, 2010).
The DRWI’s experience illustrates some of the 
limitations of donor-driven, upfront planning. 
An initial planning process by the foundation 
and a few experts left key questions unanswered, 
leading to confusion among grantees and poor 
alignment among various activities. The plan-
ning did not end there, however. The strategy 
was refined and elaborated as implementation 
In the DRWI, as in many 
other foundation initiatives, 
the challenge was not so 
much to assess the progress 
of the strategy as to clarify 
what the strategy was. The 
evaluators’ chief contribution 
was to facilitate a collaborative 
learning process by calling 
attention to the various 
tensions inherent in the 
initiative and encouraging the 
William Penn Foundation and 
its partners to find ways to 
address them.
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proceeded, and after four years the ends and 
means were more clearly understood and more 
widely embraced.
The DRWI’s Upfront Planning Process
The initiative began when foundation staff 
partnered with Drexel University’s Academy 
of Natural Sciences (ANS) and the Open Space 
Institute (OSI) to develop a comprehensive 
approach to improving water quality in the 
Delaware Basin. Key features of the new strat-
egy included:
• the identification of eight subareas, or 
“cluster areas,” within which investments 
would yield the greatest impacts, based on 
watershed characteristics, threats to water 
resources, local organizational capacity, 
and other considerations. (See Table 1 and 
Figure 2.)
TABLE 1  The Eight DRWI Clusters and Brief Descriptions
Cluster Name The Land and Water
Brandywine and Christina
Covering portions of Pennsylvania and Delaware, this suburban and 
agricultural region provides drinking water to a half-million people but for 
the past 30 years has experienced intense development that adversely 
affects forests and water quality. 
Kirkwood-Cohansey Aquifer
This area, which encompasses portions of New Jersey’s Bayshore 
and Pine Barrens, is underlain by the Kirkwood-Cohansey aquifer, an 
important source of water for drinking, irrigation, and industrial uses. 
Development threatens the aquifer and related surface water resources. 
Middle Schuylkill
This cluster comprises areas both east and west of Reading, 
Pennsylvania, and is largely rural but includes small urban areas. 
Although some of its streams are of high quality, much of the area’s 
water resources are impaired by agricultural pollution.
New Jersey Highlands
Providing drinking water for half of New Jersey’s population, this area is 
bordered by the Poconos on the north and Kittatinny Ridge on the south, 
and spans the nationally significant Appalachian Highlands landscape. It 
contains large tracts of forest and many high-quality headwaters.
Pocono-Kittatinny
A largely forested region encompassing the eastern Pocono Mountains. 
This cluster encompasses portions of Pennsylvania, New York, and 
New Jersey. Though water resources in the region are generally of high 
quality, they are threatened by rapid development in some places. 
Schuylkill Highlands
Encompassing heavily forested watersheds as well as pastoral and 
suburban landscapes, this cluster is located in densely populated Chester 
County, Pennsylvania, and includes many high-quality streams, though 
water quality is threatened by development.
Upper Lehigh
Located in the western side of Pennsylvania’s Pocono Mountains, this 
area consists primarily of largely intact forested headwaters of the Lehigh 
River, the Delaware River’s second-largest tributary. Overall water quality 
is good but threatened by development. 
Upstream Suburban Philadelphia
In this predominantly urbanized landscape west of Philadelphia, water 
resources are impaired by heavy groundwater withdrawals, impervious 
surfaces that prevent groundwater recharge, and polluted stormwater 
runoff. 
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FIGURE 2  The Delaware River Watershed and the Eight Cluster Areas
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• “cluster teams” consisting of land trusts, 
watershed associations, and other conser-
vation groups working together to develop 
implementation plans and on-the-ground 
projects within each of the eight clusters.
• two re-grant programs to support capital 
projects within the cluster areas. One of 
these was for protecting land important 
to producing clean and abundant water, 
administered by the OSI. The other was 
for restoration projects, including stream 
restoration, agricultural best management 
practices, and “green” infrastructure for 
stormwater management, administered by 
the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation 
(NFWF).
“Building the Airplane While Flying It”
Although the new approach represented a major 
change for both the foundation and the com-
munity of grantees it supported, it launched the 
initiative quickly in an effort to avoid a disrup-
tive hiatus in the flow of grant dollars, giving 
the grantees just a few months in the summer of 
2013 to prepare implementation plans for each of 
the eight cluster areas. Subsequently, three-year 
grants were awarded to the organizations com-
prising the cluster teams with the understanding 
that, given evidence of progress, the initiative 
could be supported for as long as 10 years. The 
first three-year phase was a period of develop-
ment and learning as core partners and cluster 
organizations forged new working relationships, 
began implementing quickly conceived projects, 
and negotiated with one another to clarify roles 
and expectations. Foundation staff frequently 
remarked that they were “building the airplane 
while flying it.”
Interviews by the evaluation team midway 
through Phase 1 revealed widespread support 
within the grantee community for the DRWI’s 
central aim — to align the efforts of NGOs to 
achieve measurable improvements in water 
quality through a science-informed strategy. 
Yet there was considerable uncertainty about 
what exactly the DRWI was trying to achieve. 
Grantees were told that the ability to produce 
measurable water-quality impacts would be an 
important criterion for project selection, but 
the foundation did not specify how large such 
impacts were expected to be. When evaluators 
asked at what geographical scale projects were 
expected to produce measurable impacts and 
in what time frame, grantees could not provide 
definitive answers. Nearly all were certain, how-
ever, that it would be unreasonable to expect 
measurable impacts at a large scale — cer-
tainly not at the basinwide scale, and perhaps 
not even at the scale of cluster areas. As for the 
time frame, virtually none of the interviewees 
believed that measurable impacts would be evi-
dent within the three-year term of the initial set 
of grants, and many expressed skepticism about 
seeing results by the end of the longer 10-year 
time horizon. The evaluators’ observations of 
selected projects corroborated this view. The 
DRWI participants were left with insufficient 
guidance on how to plan future projects, mea-
sure progress, and design monitoring plans, and 
some grantees wondered whether shortfalls in 
meeting possibly unrealistic expectations might 
negatively affect prospects for future grant 
awards or the entire initiative.
Water-Quality Monitoring Challenges
Another problem was poor alignment between 
water-quality monitoring efforts and on-the-
ground land protection and restoration projects. 
The DRWI funding included substantial sup-
port to the ANS for developing a state-of-the-art 
monitoring program. The foundation wanted 
to strengthen water-quality monitoring in the 
region for several reasons: to support basic 
research by the ANS, to engage the public in 
volunteer monitoring activities, and to enhance 
the ability of local conservation organizations to 
gather and use scientific data. The most obvious 
reason, however, was to measure the impacts of 
the initiative’s watershed improvement efforts.
The program developed by the ANS, which 
involved repeated sampling using sophisti-
cated methods at selected sites throughout the 
basin (Kroll & Abell, 2015), was well-designed 
to characterize the watersheds, establish base-
line conditions, and ultimately assess long-term 
trends. However, it was not capable of detecting 
changes resulting from projects funded by the 
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DRWI because there had not been enough time 
for the ANS to coordinate with cluster teams to 
establish sampling sites in areas where projects 
would occur. Some members of cluster teams 
developed their own monitoring plans with 
support from the foundation, but they were 
inconsistent in design and not well integrated 
with the basinwide ANS monitoring program.
Reflecting and Rethinking
These concerns were raised in an early eval-
uation report, and the foundation and its key 
grantees took them seriously. To clarify goals 
and expectations, the decision was made to con-
struct an explicit theory of change. The process 
involved the initiative’s core partners, though 
other participants had an opportunity to pro-
vide input at an initiativewide meeting. The 
theory of change provided a useful overview of 
the DRWI’s strategic approach, served to clarify 
the range of projects and approaches the cluster 
organizations could undertake, and led to devel-
opment of a series of performance measures. But 
it left unanswered questions about the size of 
the targeted watersheds, the time frame of the 
intended changes, and the specific water-quality 
improvements that were sought.
Realizing that many important issues had yet to 
be resolved, the foundation decided to designate 
2017 as a planning year during which partners 
would develop clearer policies and guidelines for 
Phase 2 of the DRWI. The planning year was in 
large part compensation for the initiative’s hasty 
launch, which had given grantees little time to 
coordinate their work and left them confused 
about essential details. Some problems might 
have been avoided had the initiative been more 
carefully planned at the outset.
On the other hand, a more thorough upfront 
planning process might have been premature. 
Many of the organizations collaborating at the 
cluster level had not worked together previously, 
and many of the grantees lacked experience 
with the foundation and its core partners. The 
relationships needed for a broad, participa-
tory planning process had not yet been forged. 
Through the course of Phase 1, the cluster teams 
coalesced, cross-cluster contacts were estab-
lished, and cluster organizations gained greater 
familiarity with core partners. The work of the 
Institute for Conservation Leadership (ICL), 
which included facilitation of interactions within 
cluster teams and organizing annual meetings 
that brought all partners together, played an 
important role in building these relationships. In 
addition, enough experience had accumulated 
to clarify the issues that needed attention. The 
learning acquired during the first three years had 
set the stage for a much more robust and inclu-
sive planning process during the fourth year of 
the initiative.
Learning the Strategy
The difficult, time-consuming, and sometimes 
frustrating process through which the DRWI 
elaborated and clarified its approach turned out 
to be a good example of emergent strategy. The 
upfront planning process sketched the broad 
outline of a science-informed approach, but it 
left grantees with many questions about how to 
implement the strategy in their regions and how 
to coordinate their various activities. Through 
the course of the first several years, however, the 
uncertainties and misalignments became appar-
ent, and the evaluation process helped bring 
them to the attention of the foundation and its 
core partners.
The foundation and its partners had learned 
much about what worked and did not work in 
The work of the Institute for 
Conservation Leadership (ICL), 
which included facilitation 
of interactions within cluster 
teams and organizing annual 
meetings that brought all 
partners together, played an 
important role in building 
these relationships.
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practice and incorporated that knowledge in a 
newly realized strategy, while accepting that the 
strategy would continue to evolve. As Henry 
Mintzberg, the chief exponent of emergent 
strategy in corporate planning, has remarked, 
“You don’t plan a strategy, you learn a strategy” 
(quoted in Patrizi & Heid Thompson, 2010, p. 54). 
By the fourth year of the initiative, the founda-
tion and its grantee partners had learned enough 
about the strategy to articulate its goals more 
clearly, improve coordination among activities, 
and resolve challenges that had become apparent 
through the implementation process.
Top-Down Versus 
Bottom-Up Management
To its credit, the foundation began the DRWI 
with a clear understanding of the power dynam-
ics inherent in grantmaking; and its staff, 
accustomed to a more responsive mode of 
grantmaking, was keen to avoid the appearance 
of heavy-handedness. Recognizing that many of 
their grantees had relevant scientific expertise as 
well as years of experience working with local 
landowners and communities, foundation staff 
described the DRWI as a bottom-up initiative 
in which most of the decision-making authority 
would reside with the grantee community.
The approach it chose, however, demanded a 
large degree of top-down management. The 
foundation’s desire for an overarching strategy 
informed by sound science required analysis and 
planning by experts and the alignment of efforts 
by a large and varied group of grantee organiza-
tions, most of whom were accustomed to very 
different ways of working. As much as it may 
have wanted to organize the initiative from the 
bottom up, the foundation and its core partners 
could not avoid issuing top-down directives. In 
fact, what emerged was a hybrid style of man-
agement that began as largely centralized and 
top-down but progressed toward greater decen-
tralization as the initiative developed.
Creating a Coordinating Committee
Some of the most important top-down deci-
sions were made early on with the definition of 
cluster areas and the selection of organizations 
that would make up the cluster teams. Driven 
by scientific data on watershed characteristics 
as well as judgments about local organizational 
capacity, these decisions required hard choices 
about which of the foundation’s previous grant-
ees would be eligible for continued funding. 
Once the cluster teams were formed, however, 
the foundation avoided dictating terms to them 
— so much so that some of the teams told the 
evaluators they preferred clearer directives from 
the foundation.
Recognizing the need for improved coordina-
tion and communication across all aspects of the 
initiative, the foundation added the ICL as a core 
partner to help organize and facilitate meetings, 
enhance communication within and between 
cluster teams, and encourage and facilitate 
network-building and participatory deci-
sion-making. In addition, the foundation created 
a coordinating committee composed of founda-
tion representatives and the four core partners:
• the ANS, which helped ensure that the best 
science and data were employed in the ini-
tiative’s design and implementation and in 
water-quality monitoring;
• the OSI, which administered a capital 
fund for land protection and provided 
By the fourth year of the 
initiative, the foundation 
and its grantee partners 
had learned enough about 
the strategy to articulate its 
goals more clearly, improve 
coordination among activities, 
and resolve challenges that had 
become apparent through the 
implementation process.
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science-based analysis and advice, as well as 
technical assistance, to cluster partners;
• the NFWF, which administered a capi-
tal fund for restoring targeted lands and 
provided technical assistance to cluster part-
ners; and
• the ICL, which helped facilitate effective 
collaboration among the DRWI partners.
By early 2016 the foundation had empowered the 
committee to assume responsibility for managing 
the theory of change process and, the following 
year, to lead in the development of Phase 2 guide-
lines. Meanwhile, foundation staff members had 
reduced their decision-making role, eventually 
casting themselves as advisors to the coordinat-
ing committee rather than full members.
Although the foundation had ceded much 
authority to the coordinating committee, fur-
ther devolution of management control required 
more participation from the cluster teams, a 
point that was noted by the evaluation team. 
By the beginning of Phase 2, an additional body 
had been created to broaden representation in 
decision-making. The eight “cluster coordina-
tors,” who performed administrative functions 
for their respective cluster teams, began meeting 
separately among themselves to provide input to 
the coordinating committee.
Toward Greater Grantee Empowerment
The foundation set out to change the way its 
grantees operated by coordinating their work 
around a science-informed strategy while at the 
same time hoping to organize the DRWI as a 
bottom-up initiative. This was a contradiction, 
at least in the early stages, when grantees were 
often leery about the new demands being placed 
on them. It was not unreasonable to expect, 
however, that greater decision-making authority 
could be transferred to the grantee community 
over time. To some extent this has happened 
— first, with the increased empowerment of 
coordinating committee and, more recently, 
with the elevated role of the cluster coordinators.
Although the initiative remained largely founda-
tion-driven at the end of its first phase, there was 
by that time more robust buy-in from the cluster 
organizations, as indicated by a survey conducted 
by the evaluators, and those organizations were 
developing greater capacities in water-quality 
monitoring, the use of watershed models, and 
other techniques associated with a more sci-
ence-based approach. This suggests that cluster 
organizations were becoming more willing and 
able to assume leadership roles. But additional 
progress was needed to develop a management 
structure that could truly be described as bot-
tom-up. Urging the DRWI partners to begin 
planning for the initiative’s long-term future, the 
evaluators noted that grantee ownership of the 
initiative would be essential if the DRWI was to 
have any hope of persisting beyond the founda-
tion’s 10-year time horizon. A committee known 
as the “initiative stewards,” composed mostly of 
representatives from the coordinating commit-
tee and the cluster coordinators, was formed to 
begin thinking about how the initiative could 
survive in the long term with less dependence on 
the foundation.
Although the initiative 
remained largely foundation-
driven at the end of its first 
phase, there was by that time 
more robust buy-in from the 
cluster organizations, as 
indicated by a survey conducted 
by the evaluators, and those 
organizations were developing 
greater capacities in water-
quality monitoring, the use of 
watershed models, and other 
techniques associated with a 
more science-based approach. 
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Strategic Focus Versus 
Opportunistic Flexibility
Among the most important strategic decisions 
for a grantmaker is the extent to which grant dol-
lars should be concentrated on one or a few issue 
areas. A highly focused grantmaking strategy 
improves the odds that resources will be concen-
trated enough to make a meaningful difference 
and produce observable impacts. Conversely, a 
high level of focus restricts options and may fore-
close chances to take advantage of unanticipated 
opportunities as they arise.
Strategic focus in the field of conservation often 
takes the form of geographical targeting, where 
the question is whether to limit interventions 
to areas that are especially important, such as 
biodiversity hotspots or aquifer recharge areas, 
or to pursue a more opportunistic approach 
(Martin, 2012). A degree of opportunistic flex-
ibility is essential when strategies require the 
cooperation of private landowners. Land trusts 
are necessarily opportunistic because they can 
close land deals only where owners are willing 
to sell (Delfin & Tang, 2006). Similarly, water-
shed restoration projects and agricultural best 
management practices often depend on the 
willingness of landowners to collaborate with 
conservation organizations.
Geographical targeting was built into the DRWI 
from the outset when the foundation decided to 
concentrate activities within eight cluster areas. 
But even those areas were large, diverse land-
scapes. In the expectation that concentrating 
capital projects geographically would increase 
the likelihood of measurable impacts, the cluster 
teams were asked to locate land protection and 
restoration projects within much smaller focus 
areas. In Phase 1, however, most of those focus 
areas were far too large to encourage meaningful 
spatial aggregation of projects, and there was lit-
tle consistency in the way they had been defined 
from one cluster to the next.
Although this was the view of the coordinat-
ing committee, it was not shared by many local 
implementing organizations. In a survey of clus-
ter team members conducted by the evaluators 
in January 2017, less than half of the respondents 
(44%) agreed that “capital projects should be con-
centrated within relatively small areas,” and only 
5% thought that “the focus areas defined for my 
cluster in the Phase 1 implementation plan were 
too large.”
The evaluators called attention to the stark con-
trast in thinking about focus areas and urged the 
DRWI partners to develop a new approach that 
would help concentrate projects while preserv-
ing the flexibility grantees needed to get projects 
done. The nature and size of focus areas was a 
major topic of discussion during the planning 
year as Phase 2 guidelines were being developed. 
Although the tension had not been fully resolved 
by the end of the planning period, the initiative 
had moved toward reasonable compromises. The 
coordinating committee held fast to its insistence 
on restricting the size of focus areas and basing 
their locations on scientific criteria using models 
of small watersheds developed for that purpose. 
But they understood that the focus areas had to 
be numerous enough to ensure sufficient project 
opportunities, with the expectation that measur-
able results would be achieved in only a subset of 
the targeted places. The OSI and the NFWF, the 
two organizations managing the capital funds, 
created incentives to encourage the aggregation 
of capital projects. The NFWF decided to score 
potential restoration projects higher if they were 
located near other projects, and the OSI reduced 
the match requirement for land-protection 
The evaluators called attention 
to the stark contrast in 
thinking about focus areas 
and urged the DRWI partners 
to develop a new approach 
that would help concentrate 
projects while preserving the 
flexibility grantees needed to 
get projects done. 
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projects near other protected land. If these incen-
tives work as expected, concentrations of projects 
will emerge through time in areas where resto-
ration and land protection can make a difference 
in water quality and where there happen to be 
willing landowners.
The differing views on focus areas served as 
a vivid illustration of the underlying tension 
between strategic focus and opportunistic flexi-
bility. Strategic considerations advocated by the 
coordinating committee demanded that focus 
areas be carefully chosen based on scientific 
criteria and small enough that projects would be 
spatially concentrated and cumulative impacts 
could be achieved. Implementing organizations, 
on the other hand, could conduct projects only 
where there were willing landowners, so they 
wanted to maximize project opportunities and 
access to capital funding by creating large focus 
areas. The new approach to focus areas worked 
out in Phase 2 planning was a reasonable com-
promise, but its success in balancing the interests 
of scientific planners and project implementers 
remains to be demonstrated.
Ambitious Aspirations Versus 
Realistic Expectations
The learning process the DRWI went through 
in developing its strategy was not just a matter 
of finding effective ways to achieve the goals; at 
least equally challenging was clarifying what the 
goals should be. Early in the initiative the eval-
uators called attention to the confusion around 
goal definition, but it took several years for the 
foundation and its partners to come to a shared 
understanding of what the initiative could rea-
sonably expect to achieve on its own, and what it 
could aspire to accomplish in the long run with 
the help of a wider range of stakeholders.
The resistance to articulating clearer overall 
goals stemmed in part from the foundation’s 
desire to let the cluster teams formulate specific 
goals for their local areas. In addition, many part-
ners may have been reluctant to acknowledge the 
limitations of a privately led watershed initiative. 
Comparisons to the neighboring Chesapeake 
Bay watershed, where the federal government 
was much more active, were hard to avoid. 
There, watershed improvement activities were 
driven by the federally mandated Chesapeake 
Bay Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL),1 
which set specific targets for the reduction of 
nitrogen, phosphorus, and sediment entering 
the bay. Efforts to achieve the TMDL targets 
for the Chesapeake were backed by much more 
generous state and federal resources and the 
regulatory force of law. The initiative partners 
rightly avoided setting comparable targets for 
their own work, recognizing the limited size of 
their projects and the fact that large-scale impacts 
directly attributable to the initiative would be 
unrealistic (Freedman, Ehrhart, & Hall, 2018).
Thanks to deliberations during the planning 
year, it became clear that the outcomes the 
DRWI was pursuing through its on-the-ground 
projects were much more modest than those 
being sought by the Chesapeake TMDL process. 
Having agreed that cluster teams should try to 
concentrate projects within relatively small focus 
areas, and understanding that opportunities for 
good projects would not be available in all focus 
areas, initiative leaders now expected that clus-
ter teams should seek demonstrable impacts in 
a few small subwatersheds where conditions 
and opportunities were favorable. That is, the 
[I]t took several years for the 
foundation and its partners to 
come to a shared understanding 
of what the initiative could 
reasonably expect to achieve 
on its own, and what it could 
aspire to accomplish in the long 
run with the help of a wider 
range of stakeholders.
1 TMDL is a regulatory term in the U.S. Clean Water Act.
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emphasis would be placed on developing a few 
good success stories within each cluster area.
Gone now was any fear that implementing 
organizations would be expected to produce 
outcomes that were far beyond their capacities. 
But the new question was whether a few success 
stories in scattered locations throughout the 
basin would be enough to justify tens of mil-
lions of dollars in foundation investments. That 
might seem like a meager payoff for an initiative 
of this scale. What helped allay this concern was 
a redoubled commitment to building upon and 
complementing the on-the-ground project work 
being supported through the DRWI.
The Direct and Indirect Strategies
Although land protection and restoration proj-
ects were the DRWI’s main emphasis, the 
foundation also provided funding to local 
organizations for “complementary activities” 
– outreach, education, and advocacy aimed at 
leveraging additional resources and enlisting 
the cooperation of other actors whose decisions 
affect the health of the watershed, particularly 
local governments. During the first phase of the 
initiative, however, the complementary activities 
were unfocused and poorly coordinated with 
on-the-ground projects.
The evaluation team raised questions about the 
role of complementary activities in the DRWI, 
suggesting that they should be receiving more 
attention. To encourage discussion on this issue, 
the evaluators proposed a simplified logic model 
that identified two pathways toward desired 
water-quality outcomes. (See Figure 3.) The 
“direct pathway” consisted of on-the-ground 
projects, which were expected to produce quan-
tifiable outcomes in targeted subwatersheds (i.e., 
“success stories”). In the “indirect pathway,” 
complementary activities were expected to stim-
ulate increased efforts to improve water quality.
It was presumed that success stories would 
contribute to these increased efforts through 
“proof-of-concept effects” that would help cat-
alyze additional activity. Together, the direct 
and indirect pathways were expected to produce 
water-quality outcomes on a scale larger than 
FIGURE 3  Direct and Indirect Pathways Toward Water Quality Outcomes 
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those that could be achieved by the initiative’s 
on-the-ground strategies alone. Visualizing 
the strategy in this way helped make the point 
that by pursuing success stories of modest scale 
through on-the-ground projects, the DRWI was 
not abandoning more ambitious aspirations. 
Rather, local success stories could be seen as 
intermediate outcomes that would serve as steps 
on the way toward longer-term outcomes on a 
larger scale.
In preparation for Phase 2, the coordinating 
committee developed guidelines designed to 
encourage a more strategic approach to the indi-
rect pathway. Ideally, complementary activities 
would be concentrated within focus areas that 
had been targeted for land protection and res-
toration projects. Since local governments in 
the region vary widely in respect to their will-
ingness and capacity to address water-quality 
challenges, however, there was no guarantee 
that high-priority municipalities would be recep-
tive to working with the DRWI partners. Again 
confronting the need to allow implementing 
organizations the flexibility needed to respond 
to local opportunities, the coordinating com-
mittee decided to encourage rather than require 
greater alignment between focus areas and 
local government engagement. A complemen-
tary-strategy steering committee was created 
to help cluster teams develop more strategic 
approaches to working with local governments 
and other key stakeholders.
Relieving the Burden on Project Implementers
The initiative’s challenges in defining clear goals 
and expectations were rooted in an apparent 
mismatch between the foundation’s ambitious 
aspirations and the limits of an initiative that 
emphasized privately funded, voluntary, on-the-
ground projects. But the foundation never 
intended that the DRWI should rely solely on 
the land protection and restoration projects. 
Work with local governments and other comple-
mentary activities were included from the start. 
During the first several years, however, partners 
were intent on developing and implementing the 
direct pathway while tending to overlook the 
indirect pathway.
The distinction between the two pathways 
toward the long-term outcomes reminded 
partners that complementary activities were 
important and deserved more attention. It also 
made explicit the role on-the-ground projects 
were expected to play in the initiative’s overall 
strategy; their purpose was not so much to yield 
large-scale impacts as to demonstrate what could 
be accomplished if more resources were invested 
in restoration and protection projects guided 
by sound science. This, in effect, helped relieve 
the burden on project-implementing organiza-
tions, making it clear that they were expected 
to produce some impressive success stories, not 
to achieve unrealistically large water-quality 
impacts.
Conclusions
The role of evaluation in strategic philanthropy 
is typically seen as something like the feed-
back system of a self-driving car: a destination 
is set, the feedback system monitors progress 
toward the end-point, and when obstacles are 
detected the system directs corrective actions 
to be taken. This model assumes the goal and 
the path toward it are known in advance and are 
independent of the evaluation. In our experience, 
evaluations of complex initiatives, especially 
those that begin during the early stages, cannot 
simply take the aims as given. The challenge is 
not so much to measure progress toward goals as 
to clarify what the program is trying to achieve 
and how it intends to achieve it. An important 
— often the most important — contribution an 
evaluation can make is to help a foundation learn 
its strategy.
The DRWI evaluation was originally conceived 
as a way to gauge progress toward the initiative’s 
goals, but the evaluators quickly discovered that 
such an assessment could not occur until the 
An important — often the most 
important — contribution an 
evaluation can make is to help 
a foundation learn its strategy.
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foundation and its partners addressed and clar-
ified key questions stemming from the central 
dilemma of strategic philanthropy: the desire 
for a rational, evidence-based strategy capable of 
producing measurable outcomes, and the com-
peting need to respect grantees’ local knowledge 
and give them the leeway they need to get the 
work done. The foundation struggled to bal-
ance these two demands from the outset, but 
in the early stages of the initiative neither it nor 
its grantees were clear on how to do that. The 
balancing act had to be learned. Partners had 
to come up with workable solutions to a range 
of perplexing problems: What sort of planning 
process could best combine a comprehensive, 
basinwide approach informed by scientific 
experts with local-level planning by implement-
ing organizations? What kind of organizational 
structure could provide overall coordination 
and expert guidance while allowing an appro-
priate level of input from local grantees? Could 
geographical focus areas be selected in such a 
way as to direct project resources to locations 
where they would be most likely to make a dif-
ference, while at the same time giving project 
implementers enough flexibility to respond to 
opportunities? Could partners agree on goals 
that were ambitious enough to justify a large 
foundation investment without creating unreal-
istic expectations for grantees?
The evaluators’ role was not to provide answers 
to such questions, but to continually raise them 
— to act as Socratic interrogators drawing 
attention to ambiguities and contradictions and 
encouraging participants to address them. While 
the tensions have not been entirely eliminated, 
the initiative has made substantial progress 
in managing them. In the areas of planning, 
management, geographical targeting, and goal 
setting, the experts and implementers have nego-
tiated with each other to reach compromises 
and mutually agreed solutions. As the initiative 
began its second phase, partners were much 
more confident in the strategic approach and 
organizational arrangements than they were at 
the outset.
Although this article has described tensions 
unique to the DRWI, all strategic grantmakers 
must confront the underlying conflict between 
rational strategizing and respect for grant-
ees’ autonomy. They must set goals that are 
appropriately ambitious without creating unre-
alistic expectations for their grantees. They 
must develop planning processes and manage-
ment structures that weigh foundation-driven 
strategizing against the need to learn from grant-
ees and their experiences in the field. They must 
develop approaches that are focused enough to 
produce concrete results while allowing grantees 
the flexibility needed to respond to unanticipated 
opportunities. Each initiative will need to go 
through its own learning process to find ways to 
deal with the resulting challenges, and evalua-
tors can be important partners in this process.
The evaluators’ role was not 
to provide answers to such 
questions, but to continually 
raise them — to act as 
Socratic interrogators drawing 
attention to ambiguities and 
contradictions and encouraging 
participants to address them. 
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